This is the actual cover of the January 2009 issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (a publication I have read recreationally, albeit sporadically, since college).
The cover sort of makes sense when you read the first article in the issue:
Beware of the Unicorn
Consciousness as Being Represented and Other Things that Don’t Exist
Abstract: Higher-Order Representational theories of consciousness -- HORs -- primarily seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state. First-Order Representational theories of consciousness -- FORs -- primarily seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this paper I develop an argument -- the Unicorn Argument -- against both HORs and FORs. The core of the Unicorn is that since there are mental representations of things that do not exist, there cannot be any such property as being represented, and thus no such property with which to identify either being conscious or being phenomenal.
Mandik repeatedly refers to his Unicorn Argument as "the Unicorn," creating sentences such as, "In sections 4 and 7, I examine and reject proposals that HORs and FORs may save themselves from the Unicorn by embracing the Direct Reference hypothesis (DR)."
The Unicorn is coming! Save yourself!
You can download a PDF of the paper from Pete Mandik's blog, Brain Hammer.